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Abstract Producers’ acreage decisions in response to the 
availability of insurance and government subsidy has been 
a topic of considerable attention. This study revisits the 
issue of agriculture producers’ production behavior under crop 
insurance and premium subsidy conditions. The discussion 
begins by differentiating between the assumptions of the 
classic insurance model and that model’s application to crop 
insurance. A discussion of a closed dual economy model 
follows. Price difference in cases of disaster and no disaster 
essentially determines producers’ response to the availability 
of a premium subsidy. A producer can obtain higher production 
revenue due to the significant increase in price induced by 
yield loss if the economy is closed and a subsistence constraint 
is taken into account. In this case, a premium subsidy could 
induce producers to lower their output level. The result is 
further generalized by two model extensions in which 
assumptions are relaxed to allow openness in the economy or 
intertemporal storage of grains with grain reserve policy. The 
findings of this article suggest that governments should 
carefully examine the actual risk-bearing pattern of crop 
producers before any subsidy policy is implemented.
Keywords output decision-making; premium subsidy; risk-
bearing pattern; yield-revenue relationship
1 Introduction
National governments frequently provide a direct subsidy to 
the crop insurance premium paid by producers so as to achieve 
varied economic and political goals. Early adopters of this 
policy instrument were the United States, Canada, and Japan 
(Barnett 2007). Recently, China, whose agricultural popula-
tion is one of the world’s largest, launched a similar program 
and heavy subsidies are now paid to producers (Shi et al. 
2008; Wang et al. 2011). 
Whether it is a good choice to provide subsidies to 
insurance premiums remains controversial although there 
have already been actual cases. Some researchers believe the 
subsidy policy is designed for income enhancement rather 
than for the purpose of risk management (Goodwin 2001). 
Regardless of the institutional design, Skees (1999) believes 
the practice of providing subsidies actually fails to produce 
either efficiency or equity. The subsidy instrument is also 
regarded as an incentive tool to allow producers to increase 
their output levels (Ahsan, Ali, and Kurian 1982; Nelson 
and Loehman 1987). The abundance of agricultural product 
generated by the subsidy will induce large price drops and 
promote social welfare, but only consumers are likely to reap 
the benefits. In this sense, rural producers would be better 
compensated by the government via redistribution policies 
carried out, for example, in the form of an insurance premium 
subsidy (Hazell 1981; Siamwalla and Valdes 1986). The 
“incentive” hypothesis regarding a crop insurance subsidy 
policy as a tool to encourage agricultural production is 
very attractive for some governments (Goodwin 2001). For 
instance, it is inferred that the major purpose of China’s sub-
sidy to crop insurance premiums is to enlarge domestic grain 
output, particularly after the experience of a 100 million ton 
drop in grain output during 1999–2003 (Swiss Re 2008).
Whether the incentive hypothesis is justifiable essentially 
depends on producers’ investment choices in the face of 
uncertain returns from production when insurance coverage 
is available. Studies of agricultural producers’ behavior have 
enjoyed considerable success and there are models ready to 
use. In the most general framework of the insurance model, a 
decreased effective premium rate (for example, when the 
actual premium rate paid by policyholders is reduced by 
providing a premium subsidy) will encourage policyholders 
to take more risk. If the same law applies to crop insurance, 
then producers will be encouraged to plan for higher output 
when a premium subsidy is provided. Previous empirical 
studies reveal some modest effect of a decreased premium on 
acreage increase in the United States (Goodwin, Vandeveer, 
and Deal 2004; Wu and Adams 2001). Whether this is true in 
a more generalized context is the main topic of this article. 
The key focus of this article is producers’ production 
behavior in response to insurance and premium rate changes. 
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, a classic 
insurance model and a crop insurance model are formulated 
for comparison, particularly in terms of the policyholder’s 
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production behavior (including output and insurance 
decisions) when the effective premium rate changes. Then at-
tention shifts to the circumstances in which different state-
contingent price and revenue structures occur and change 
producers’ behavior. In section 3, we consider a stylized close 
economy with inelastically demanded agricultural products, 
just as Hazell (1981) assumed in his study. Section 4 
generalizes the model in section 3 by providing two model 
extensions, with model specifications that are much closer to 
reality. Finally, the entire study is summarized and the gap 
between this theoretical work and possible policy implications 
are discussed. 
2 From the Classic Insurance Model to 
the Crop Insurance Model
This section starts from the most fundamental insurance 
model discussing policyholders’ behavior under premium 
subsidy. By updating the classic model, we will show the 
essential changes when the policyholders are agricultural 
producers and the price of agricultural product is taken into 
account.
2.1 A Classic Model of Policyholders’ Risk-Taking 
Behavior under Premium Subsidy
A general description of a risk bearer’s behavior under 
insurance can be put into a two-state model. Suppose there is 
an agent who is uncertain about his income return in the 
coming period. There are two possible outcomes, a lucky 
state and an unlucky state, each with probability of p(0) and 
p(1), respectively. p(0) + p(1) = 1. In the lucky state, the agent 
gets a return of X as planned. In the unlucky state, a proportion 
of 0 < d ≤ 1 will be taken away by some adverse events 
and consequently the producer gets a revenue of (1 – d)X. 
The cost for the producer to get the return of X is C(X), which 
is convex, continuous, and twice differentiable, with C′(·), 
C″(·) > 0. Insurance for the investment is available at the cost 
of n per unit coverage. The investor’s problem is to choose 
the desired revenue level X and insurance coverage so as to 




t u e t U = ( ) ( )( )∑ p ,
in which u(e(t)) is the maximal welfare that the investor can 
obtain by choosing the best consumption bundle with state-
contingent income e(t). In this sense, the policyholder’s 
utility/welfare level in a specific state only depends on 
income. The corresponding budget constraint is 
 e t C X t X t m( ) = − ( ) + − ⋅( ) + −( )1 d n , for t = 0, 1. Eq. 1
So at the beginning of each period, the agent will have to 
borrow some “money” C(X) to invest and insure the investment 
at the cost of nm, which is supposed to be repaid after the 
revenue is realized. If disasters happen in the following 
season, then t = 1 and the insurance indemnity is m. If an 
interior solutioni is assumed, the first-order conditions for 
maximization satisfy
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Re-arrange Eq. 2 and derive comparative statics:
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. Eq. 3
In Eq. 3, 0 < d ≤ 1 and C″(·) > 0 according to our assumption, 
it holds that a decrease in the effective premium rate will 
encourage the producer to produce more. In the context of this 
article, a decrease in the effective premium rate, n, can be 
achieved by providing a subsidy to the nominal premium rate 
in the market. Consequently, Eq. 3 implies that the premium 
subsidy will encourage producers to enlarge the output level. 
2.2 A Basic Model about Crop Producers’ Behavior 
under Premium Subsidy
Now we put the classic insurance model into the context of 
risk transfer for crop producers, by taking state-contingent 
prices, p(0) and p(1) into account. Budget constraints for the 
optimization problem for the producer change to
   e t C X p t t X t m( ) = − ( ) + ( ) − ⋅( ) + −( )1 d n ,  Eq. 4
for t = 0,  1.
In practice, crop insurance coverage is measured and 
indemnity is calculated with weights, for example kilograms 
or bushels. The actual economic compensation that a producer 
can obtain depends on actual harvest loss and price guarantee 
in the case of yield insurance (Barnett 2007): 
      m X= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≤ ≤r s d r r and 0 . Eq. 5
In the equation, s is the predefined price guarantee, and r is 
the comprehensive coverage ratio, the decision variable for 
the producer, which determines the percentage of the planned 
output X that is insured. It is a compound variable consisting 
two variables: guarantee level and the insured proportion. The 
guarantee level is the critical ratio of actual yield to hypothetical 
yield that triggers indemnity. For instance, in the Federal 
Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) of the United States, a farmer 
can choose a guarantee level of 65, 75, or 85 percent. If the 
actual yield goes below 65, 75, or 85 percent of the hypothetical 
yield, the farmer will get paid correspondingly. The insured 
proportion refers to the ratio of insured acreage to total 
acreage that the producer operates. This ratio should not be 
larger than 1, because only cultivated farmland can actually 
be insured. Both variables together determine the maximal 
proportion of the total output that is covered by insurance. 
This level is determined by the producer when crop insurance 
is purchased, but it cannot go beyond its upper limit r , that 
is, 85 percent for the guarantee level and 1 for the insured 
proportion. 
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As the coverage ratio r r∈[ ]0, , there are three types 
of optimal choices: zero coverage r = 0, partial coverage 
0 < r < r, and capped coverage r r= , with three correspond-
ing first-order conditions:
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          for t = 0,  1, 
Eq. 6
where the Lagrangian multiplier l(t) is the marginal expected 
ex ante utility, p(t)u′(e(t)) with respect to income in state t 
specified in Eq. 4. The multiplier represents the marginal 
utility increase/decrease in response to the change in income 
of each state. The first-order conditions indicate that the 
optimal output choice is to exactly equalize the expected 
marginal welfare gain/loss in both states, so that no more 
welfare can be obtained on average. 
We are particularly interested in the producer’s investment 
behavior change in response to the effective premium rate 
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in which DR is defined as the cross-state product revenue 
difference, DR = [p(1)(1 – d) – p(0)]X, and Dpe is the effective 
price difference, Dpe = p(1)(1 – d) – p(0). The way that the 
producer responds to a premium change essentially depends 
on the cross-state revenue difference. If the producer can 
get higher product revenue in the unlucky state, it holds 
that Dpe > 0 and consequently dX/dn > 0. The producer will 
correspondingly reduce the output level. 
2.3 From the Classic Insurance Model to the Crop 
Insurance Model 
The classic insurance model could be regarded as a special 
case among crop insurance models by assuming equal prices 
across states. But there are substantial differences in the 
economic implications between the two models: 
(1) The loss in yield (substantial) and the loss in revenue 
(monetary)
The key difference between the loss in yield and the loss 
in revenue is the price system, particularly when state-
contingent prices are different. Producers are surely victims 
in terms of yield loss but not necessarily losers of product 
revenue. For certain types of agricultural product, especially 
fresh fruits and vegetables, a temporary shortage in supply 
could raise the price much more significantly than the size of 
drop in supply, and some suppliers may benefit instead. In 
this sense, the yield-revenue relationship rather than the yield-
price relationship is critical when producers’ behavior under 
conditions of uncertainty is discussed. Negative correlation 
between yield and price is generally assumed (Wang, Hanson, 
and Black 2003; Innes 2003; Babcock and Hennessy 1996) 
instead of a negative yield-revenue correlation.
(2) The loss in yield (substantial) and the insurance indemnity 
(monetary)
The second issue is whether the loss in yield can be 
compensated by providing monetary insurance indemnity, 
particularly when yield loss and indemnity have different 
roles to play in maintaining utility. When the goods for 
providing utility are assumed to be perfectly substitutable the 
answer is yes. Otherwise, the answer depends on whether 
there is a large free market from which policyholders can 
purchase enough agricultural products with monetary 
indemnities paid by insurers. In reality this situation is 
usually not the case. The price in the domestic market is likely 
to rise after a disaster event. The international food market 
is a high friction institution and the price is usually highly 
loaded because of transaction costs. Even if producers are 
compensated monetarily, aggregate products remain in short 
supply, and the price could go beyond the affordable means of 
consumers. Foreign insurance contracts could even induce 
inflation in some local areas, because of an oversupply of 
money. 
3 Crop Insurance Model in a Closed 
Economy with Subsistence Constraint
The comparison in the last section reveals the critical 
difference between a generalized model describing 
policyholder’s risk-taking behavior in response to insurance 
price change, and its specification to a crop insurance case. 
Can there exist the case of an unusual state-contingent revenue 
structure in which a producer earns more when a disaster 
occurs? The answer requires further specification of the 
economy. In this section, by providing the details of an entire 
economy, a closed dual economy is considered for the 
discussion, which can be regarded as a further specification of 
the crop insurance model discussed in section 2.2. 
3.1 Model Assumptions
Consider a closed economy with two sectors, agricultural (A) 
and manufactory (M), producing homogeneous agricultural 
products (A-goods) and homogeneous manufacturing 
products (M-goods), respectively. M-goods are assumed to be 
able to transact internationally and serve as the numéraire in 
the model. There is a population of laborers with a proportion 
of n working in the agriculture sector who are called 
“producers” and (1 – n) working in the manufactory sector, 
called “workers.” Without loss of generality, the population is 
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normalized to 1. The allocation parameter n is exogenously 
determined, reflecting a long-term equilibrium where the 
share of population engaging in farming and manufactory 
remains unchanged. 
The model is in a static framework, with economic 
activities repeating period by period. Individuals are usually 
assumed in the literature to be rational utility maximizeers. 
At the end of each period, the consumption stage, each 
individual tries to maximize the ex post utility level provided 
by known labor income and prices of goods, V(p(t),  e(t)) = 
arg  max  u(x(t),  y(t)) s.t. p(t)x(t) + y(t) = e(t),  for t = 0, 1, x(t) 
and y(t) denote state-contingent consumption of A-goods and 
M-goods, correspondingly. State-contingent social aggregate 
A-goods available for consumption are the plain aggregation 
of individual output, ( ) ( )1X t n t X= −∑ d . It is assumed that 
the M-sector is bared little risk, and under necessary 
assumptions social aggregate M-goods for consumption will 
be simply total wages paid to workers, (1 – n)w, minus the 
part used in agricultural production, Y = (1 – n)w – nC(X). In 
this sense, the social budget constraint follows
   
nx t n x t X t
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( ) + −( ) ( ) ≤
∑ , for t = 0, 1, Eq. 8
where variables with “*” denote optimal choice, and subscripts 
“1” and “2” represent farmers and workers, correspondingly. 
In other words, the aggregate amount of A-goods and M-
goods consumed by farmers and workers should not exceed 
the actual product available. Given the information provided 
above, equilibrium can be derived according to Walras’ Law, 
by assuming interior solutions, determined by the vector of 
state-contingent prices, p(t). 
At the beginning of each period, each producer makes a 
production decision to maximize his expected ex ante utility. 
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preference is assumed, 
W(V) = V 1 – h/(1 – h) for h > 0, h ≠ 1 and ln(n) for h = 1, as 
suggested by Myers (1989). Producers have the similar 
planning problem to section 2.2: 
max ,
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Δ  for t = 0, 1, Eq. 9
in which V1(·) is the ex post maximized indirect utility 
function. The Greek letter ahead of each budget constraint 
is its corresponding Lagrangian multiplier. The first-order 
condition will be identical to Eq. 6 in the analytical form, 
except l p1 1 1 1t t W V e t p t e t( ) = ( )∂ ( ) ( )( )( ) ∂ ( ),  in which the 
ex ante utility function W1(·) is incorporated. 
3.2 Ex Post Equilibrium under Subsistence Constraint 
The model stresses the impact of the subsistence constraint 
on state-contingent prices of A-goods. Constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) utility functions with negative elasticity 
would be good choices. An alternative is to set a constant 
x  in the C-D utility function, denoting the minimal level of x 
to maintain utility, known as the Stone-Geary utility function 
(Neary 1997), for example, u(x,  y) = A · (x – x )a   y1 – a, with 
0 < a < 1 and A = a–a(1 – a)a – 1 used to simplify denotation. The 
Stone-Geary utility families are widely adopted in macro 
economic growth models. With this assumption, individuals’ 
ex post indirect utility level Vi(ei(t), p(t)) is a linear system 
with respect to labor income used for non-subsistence 
consumption (in the Stone-Geary system, p(t)x  is part of the 
expenditure used for “subsistence consumption”):
V e t p t u x y p t e t p t x
x y
( ) ( )( ) = ( ) = ( ) ( ) − ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦−, arg max ,,
a ,
         for t = 0,  1, Eq. 10
in which p(t) is the relative price of the A-goods relative to the 
M-goods. The rural producer’s labor income follows e1(t) = 
p(t)d(t)X – C(X), which reflects product revenue minus the 
costs for production, and the urban worker’s labor income is 
e2(t) = e2 = w, the wage paid by firms, for t = 0, 1. 
Given the specifications above, the ex post equilibrium 
can be derived by specifying the Stone-Geary utility function, 
solving for the individual optimal consumption bundle 
x t y ti i
* *,( ) ( )( )  and inserting both into Eq. 8:
   p t Y
n t X x
( ) =
− −( ) −
a
a d1 1
, for t = 0,  1, Eq. 11
which is determined by the ratio between social aggregate 
M-goods available for consumption and social aggregate 
A-goods available for non-subsistence consumption, and the 
elasticity of substitution between A-goods and M-goods. 
The basic features of the ex post equilibrium can be 
highlighted by inequalities, e1(0) < e1(1) and V2(0) > V2(1): a 
loss in yield may not necessarily induce a loss in revenue.ii 
Due to the inelastic demand of crop goods, a drop in crop 
supply may induce larger price increases, and consequently 
revenue may still increase. Note that this result is also valid 
for other instant utility families, such as the CES utility 
families with a complementary relationship between goods. 
When x  goes down to 0, or the elasticity of substitution 
between goods returns to unit if another CES utility family is 
assumed, the utility function collapses to the Cobb-Douglas 
type, the product revenue will be reserved across both states, 
where p(t)(1 – t · d)=constant. 
For further discussion, note that a long-run equilibrium in 
the cross-sector labor market implies e1(0) < e2 < e1(1). If 
producers always get less labor income than workers, then 
gradually the urban sector will attract more laborers, or vice 
versa. With this structure, it holds that |DV1| < |DV2| and 
Var(V1) < Var(V2).iii Recall the ex post indirect utility function 
of Eq. 10. It has two components, the price factor p(t)–a 
and the income factor e t p t x( ) − ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . Correspondingly, the 
impact of disaster on the ex post indirect utility can be 
decomposed into two pieces of effect, the “price effect” (PE) 
and the “revenue effect” (RE): 
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If the unlucky state is initiated by nature, the price effect is 
negative to all individuals, PEi < 0, for i = 1,  2, because the 
rise in price undermines purchasing power. Workers’ incomes 
are not affected as assumed and RE2 = 0. Producers can get 
higher revenue which creates positive effects to the state-
contingent utility, RE1 > 0. In this sense, the drop in producers’ 
utility is certainly smaller than the one in the workers’, since 
the revenue effect offsets a part of the negative effect induced 
by the rise in price. 
The state-contingent utility structure reveals the actual 
risk-bearing pattern in this economy in which urban workers 
actually bear more risks than rural producers. This pattern is 
quite different from the model’s assumption that disasters 
happen only to the rural sector and the urban sector is risk-
free. This effect is a direct consequence of the subsistence 
constraint and a closed-static economy, which shifts most 
of the risks from producers to workers (pure consumers of 
A-goods). Under this framework, it is impossible to use a 
domestic insurance market to transfer risk from rural producers 
to urban consumers if they are homogeneously risk-averse. 
This could be one reason why crop insurance programs fail. 
3.3 Producers’ Production Behavior and Crop 
Insurance
Following the discussion in section 2.2 it is straightforward 
that
       d dpc pcX X Xn > <0 0, . Eq. 12
The producer sector will reduce its output level when the 
effective premium rate drops, if it partially insures its crop 
production. A premium subsidy policy can stimulate producers 
to produce more than is the case if no insurance is available 
provided that the coverage is offered for free. The supply 
function of the producers with respect to the effective premium 
rate is depicted in Figure 1. In the figure, the first quadrant 
represents the demand function of crop insurance, crop 
insurance coverage m as a function of premium rate n. Sub-
scripts “pc” and “fc” represent the cases of partial coverage 
and full coverage, correspondingly. The second quadrant 
reveals the relationship between output decision X and 
effective premium rate n. There are critical turning points on 
both curves, showing significant difference between the cases 
of partial coverage and full coverage. 
There are several critical values of n in figure 1. 
(1) n0 is the critical effective premium rate that makes a 





1 1= ( ) ( ) <∑ =tt , the weight of the expected 
marginal ex ante utility associated to the unlucky state, 
l p1 1 1 1t t W V e t p t e t( ) = ( )∂ ( ) ( )( )( ) ∂ ( ), . 
(2) n1 is the critical effective premium rate that makes a 
rural producer indifferent to capped coverage and partial 
coverage. This function is located at the intersection of Xpc 
and Xfc.
(3) n2 is the intersection point of Xfc and X0. Producers will 
produce more than the benchmark case only if the effective 
premium rate is cheaper than n2.
4 Two Extensions towards Reality
The purpose of this section is to address the production 
behavior of producers in a more flexible and realistic 
framework. Two extensions to the model in the previous 
section are provided, considering: (1) the openness of the 
economy; and (2) techniques for cross-period storage of 
the A-goods, such as a grain reserve policy and storage 
facilities. 
4.1 The Openness of the Economy
The first alternative setting of the model is to open the 
economy. Suppose that the international market is providing 
a stable and unlimited supply of both A-goods and M-goods, 
which are perfectly substitutable for domestic ones. In the 
simplest case, assume that the economy is perfectly open and 
local people are free to access the international market for 
both goods. In this sense, the domestic price of A-goods will 
converge toward the price level existing in the international 
market. If originally the domestic price is lower than the 
international price, local producers will increase their price to 
the international level because potentially they can sell their 
output to the international market. Or if the domestic price is 
higher than the international one, the local producer will have 
to drop the local price. Otherwise no consumer will buy 
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A-goods from them. Perfect openness diminishes the state-
contingent price difference. Consequently, the rural producer 
bears all the output risk. The model collapses to the most 
general case of a uniform price structure or the classic 
insurance model. 
Consider the case of a semi-open economy for A-goods 
instead. Goods still are perfectly substitutable. There is a 
price for A-goods in the international market, pf. But local 
A-goods are not able to access the international food market, 
for reasons such as prohibited A-goods exportation, or high-
transaction costs in exportation. Consequently, there is no 
chance for the domestic price to converge to the international 
one. 
Briefly, there could be three cases in this semi-open 
economy. If the price in the international market is low 
enough, such that pf < p(0) < p(1), then local producers have 
to sell their A-goods at the international price, because 
otherwise every consumer will choose to buy from the 
international market. If the international price lies exactly in 
between the domestic prices in the lucky state and the unlucky 
state, p(0) < pf < p(1), then in the lucky state, producers sell at 
the domestic price p(0) while in the unlucky state, local 
producers have to sell at the price pf. In the last case, if 
p(0) < p(1) < pf, then the equilibrium will be equivalent to the 
one mentioned in the previous section and the international 
food market is in effect not working. 
Therefore, price in the unlucky state changes to 
p p p= ( ){ }min ,1 f  and it holds that 
















= −( ) − ( ) >1 0 0d . Eq. 13
This means that the difference between state-contingent 
effective prices is monotonically increasing with the increase 
in price in the unlucky state. If pf ≥ p(1), it holds that Dpe, 
DR > 0 and is equivalent to the benchmark case. If the inter-
national price is exactly pf = p(0), it holds that Dpe, DR < 0. 
If DR is a monotonically increasing function with respect to 
p, there must be a critical international price p p p0 1( ) < < ( )f*  
that allows Dpe, DR = 0, and
(1) If ( ) f f0 *p p p≤ <  and Dpe, DR < 0, pcd d 0X <n . The 
drop in the effective premium rate encourages producers to 
enlarge their outputs. This case converges to the most general 
case in section 2.1 where state-contingent prices are not taken 
into account, just as described in Eq. 3. 
(2) If f f
*p p=  and Dpe, DR = 0, pcd d 0X =n . The drop in 
the effective premium rate has no impact on the desired output 
level.
(3) If f f
*p p<  and Dpe, DR > 0, pcd d 0X >n . The drop in 
the effective premium rate induces producers to reduce their 
output. This case converges to the case described in section 
3.3 and Figure 1.
4.2 Grain Reserve Policy
Another case that may generalize the basic model to more 
realistic cases is the grain reserve policy, which is an 
application of the classic buffer-stock strategy for grain 
products. It is a well known instrument for intertemporal 
spreading of grain supply risk. The risk is that natural disasters 
may happen and destroy some proportion of a harvest. With a 
grain reserve, generally the government puts grains into the 
market to increase supply and prevent the price from going 
too high when supply drops due to natural events. Those 
grains could be either stored before the disaster occurs when 
there was a good harvest, or bought from the international 
food market when food shortfalls are obvious. 
What is going to happen if the government of the closed-
economy in the basic model decides to adopt a grain reserve 
policy? For each state t, the government may reduce or 
increase the market supply by g(t). In this sense, 
nx t n x t n t X g t1 21 1
* *( ) + −( ) ( ) = −( ) + ( )d , for t = 0, 1. Eq. 14
There are several ways for the government to do so (Ye 2009). 
For instance, it can be done merely in substantial form, 
collecting and storing grains in lucky states and later put these 
grains to the market in unlucky states. Alternatively, the 
government may follow market transaction and fluctuations 
through buying and selling. If the government adopts an 
intervention approach, which is neutral to the ex post price 
system, state-contingent prices change to 
  ( ) ( ) ( )1 1= − − − +
Y
p t




, for t = 0, 1, Eq. 15
where the circumflex symbol is used as a reminder that the 
price in Eq. 15 is different from earlier cases. The word 
“neutral” refers to the fact that the ex post equilibrium price 
is still determined by the ratio of total A-goods and M-goods 
available in the market. So it follows that ( ) ( )d dp t g t <
( ) ( )220 d dp t g t< , for t = 0, 1. State-contingent prices are 
convex sets of their corresponding intervention variable. 
The state-contingent intervention actions, g, must follow 
the budget constraint for the government, that is, the grain 
stored in the lucky years must be able to support grain used in 
the unlucky years, ( ) ( ) 0≥∑ t t g tp , on average. The simplest 
case is to assume that the storage technique is perfect and 
there is no time-discount factor for both the quality and 
quantity of grains reserved, ( ) ( ) 0=∑ t t g tp . 
Similar to the discussion in section 4.1, we are interested 
in the impact of a grain reserve policy on the cross-state 
effective revenue/price difference, which essentially 



































        for i = 0, pc, fc. Eq. 16
Eq. 16 says that if the government reduces the market supply 
of A-goods in the lucky state (g(0) < 0) and increases that 
supply in the unlucky state, the state-contingent effective 
price difference will shrink. In this sense, there must be two 
critical intervention vectors: (1) g*, which allows ( ) ( )0 1=p pˆ ˆ  
and DR < 0, and (2) g**, which holds ( ) ( )( )0 1 1= −p pˆ ˆ d , and 
DR = 0. 
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Therefore, the following observations are obtained:
(1) If g** < g < g* and DR < 0, pcd d 0X <n . The drop in the 
effective premium rate encourages producers to enlarge their 
outputs, as described in Eq. 16. 
(2) If g = g** and DR = 0, pcd d 0X =n . The drop in the 
effective premium rate has no impact on the desired output 
level. 
(3) If 0 < g < g** and DR > 0, pcd d 0X >n . The drop in the 
effective premium rate induces producers to reduce their 
outputs. This case converges to the case described in section 
3.3 and Figure 1.
4.3 Summary of the Model and Extensions
Model extensions described in section 4.1 and 4.2 are 
generalized as in Figure 2. 
In Figure 2 there are four parallel x-axes. The top one rep-
resents major factors, which could either be the international 
food market price pf or government intervention strength g. 
The axis immediately below represents the cross-state price 
difference. The third axis denotes the cross-state product 
revenue / effective price difference. The bottom axis shows 
the allocation of risk between two groups of people: urban 
consumers and rural producers. Each point on the four axes 
corresponds to the same point on each of the other axes. The 
left y-axis refers to the benchmark case, where we have 
neither an international food market (or pf ≥ p(1)) nor 
government intervention (g = 0), both price difference and 
revenue difference are negative, and urban consumers are 
bearing all the risks related to a reduction in the production of 
A-goods. 
Critical case 1 refers to either pf = pf* or g = g**, which 
exactly allow Dpe < 0, as well as Dp < 0. At this point, the 
urban consumer and the rural producer bear the same amount 
of risk in the price system, since people in both groups have 
certain incomes but face the same uncertain price. Particularly 
if the long-run equilibrium in the labor market is taken into 
account, and if at equilibrium the urban consumer and the 
rural producer have the same ex ante expected utility level, 
case 1 will be the risk-equivalent point for the rural producer 
and the urban consumer. Critical case 2 refers to pf = p(0) or 
g = g*, which exactly allow Dp = 0 and Dpe < 0. At this point, 
urban consumers will be risk-free since the income as well as 
market price is certain. Rural producers are bearing all the 
risk in this economy.
It is worth noting that from the benchmark case to the 
critical cases, the change is not necessarily discrete. There is 
a continuum of cross-state price differences, effective price / 
product revenue differences, and risk-allocation patterns 
between the urban consumer and the rural producer, for any 
arbitrary values on the factor axis. In this sense, we partially 
bridge the ideal model benchmark to reality to some degree. 
In the region between the benchmark and the critical case 1, 
a drop in the premium rate of crop insurance will induce 
producers to reduce their optimal output level. This situation 
is rarely observed in reality because of the existence of 
an international food market and government intervention. 
What we have observed generally is that the market price 
fluctuates around p(0), and of course the implications change 
correspondingly. 
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have distinguished the difference between 
classic insurance theory and its application to crop insurance 
programs. The article also investigates the general hypothesis 
that a reduced price for risk-transfer encourages risk bearers 
to take on more risk in their investment. The discussion about 
agricultural producers’ production behavior under a premium 
subsidy policy is put in the context of a basic model with 
closed dual economy and its two extensions, the openness of 
the economy and a grain reserve policy. The stylized model 
reveals the original structure of producers’ behavior under 
crop insurance, where the cross-state revenue structure is 
essential. Although the benchmark model derives logical but 
unrealistic results, its extensions successfully fill the gap. The 
two extensions are more generalized forms than the benchmark 
model and incorporate more flexible cross-state price 
structures. 
Several observations are important from this model. First, 
critical parameters in crop insurance models, including loss in 
yield, loss in revenue, and insurance indemnity, are essentially 
different in terms of their function in maintaining producers’ 
utility. It is critical to take the price system into account so as 
to observe such differences. 
Second, it is the actual risk-bearing pattern that determines 
the supplier and the demander of domestic crop insurance. 
This actual risk-bearing pattern may not necessarily coincide 
with the one assumed. For instance, in the benchmark model, 
rural producers are the direct risk-bearers but eventually it is 
the urban consumers who are affected by the yield loss risk. 
When the model is generalized and more flexible cross-state 
price structures are assumed, the pattern of risk-bearing 
changes correspondingly. 
Last but not least, whether a producer will increase output 
level depends on several issues. If the capping issue is not 
taken into account, then output levels are essentially 
determined by the state-contingent revenue structure. The 


















Figure 2. Cross-state price and revenue difference and risk 
allocation under different model assumptions
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structure may differ. Price of the agricultural product and 
its foreign substitutes, and the feasibility of intertemporal 
storage, may have considerable impact on the revenue 
structure, and consequently producers will respond differently 
should the effective premium rate drop. 
Policy implications of the modeling for government-
subsidized crop insurance programs is also an important out-
come, although in many countries existing practice is correct 
according to the model’s results. In most realistic cases, rural 
producers suffer from product revenue decline induced by 
disasters and they are the true bearer of risks. Reducing the 
effective premium rate by providing a subsidy encourages 
rural producers to enlarge their output level. A premium 
subsidy can also be justified as it provides financial aid to 
producers, who are victims of the risks incurred, particularly 
when a grain reserve policy is adopted. For certain crop 
regions where the price structure allows higher revenue when 
there is a fall in crop yield than the case when there is a nor-
mal harvest, as has been illustrated by our models, the subsidy 
approach is not suggested since it only leads to the opposite 
effect of reduced output. 
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Notes
i Interior solution means that the optimal choice lies in the constraint 
set rather than on the boundary of the constraint set. If the optimal 
choice lies exactly on the boundary of the constraint set, it is called 
binding solution. For instance, if we have an inequality constraint 
h(x) ≤ y, optimal solutions that allow h(x*) < y are interior solutions, 
while solutions that allow h(x*) = y are binding solutions.
ii The revenue difference in both states can be denoted as: 
p X p X YX
x
nX x n X x
0 1 1
1 1
( ) − ( ) −( ) =






. For any 
1 > d ≥ 0, it necessarily holds that p(0)X – p(1)dX < 0.
iii From Eq. 10 it can be derived that
 
Δ ΔV V V V V V
p e e
1 2 1 1 2 2
1 2
1 0 1 0
0 0 0
− = ( ) − ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − ( ) − ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
= − ( ) ( ) − ( )−a ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + ( ) ( ) − ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
−
p e e1 1 11 2
a
.
 When it is assumed e1(0) < e2(0) = e2(1) < e1(1) , it holds that 
0 > DV1 > DV2. 
 Var E E in p pi i iV t V V( ) = ( ) −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ } = ( ) ( )( )2 20 1 Δ .
 Consequently Var(n1) < Var(n2).
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